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Abstract 
Game theoretic predictions about equilibrium behavior depend 
upon assumptions of inflexibility of belief, of accord between 
belief and choice, and of choice across situations that share a 
game-theoretic structure. However, researchers rarely possess any 
knowledge of the actual beliefs of subjects, and rarely compare 
how a subject behaves in settings that share game-theoretic 
structure but that differ in other respects.  Our within-subject 
experiments utilize a belief elicitation mechanism, roughly 
similar to a prediction market, in a laboratory setting to identify 
subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices and beliefs.  These 
experiments additionally allow us to compare choices in different 
settings that have similar game-theoretic structure.  We find first, 
as have others,that subjects’ choices in the Trust and related 
games are significantly different from the strategies that derive 
from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium principles. We show that, 
for individual subjects, there is considerable flexibility of choice 
and belief across similar tasks and that the relationship between 
belief and choice is similarly flexible.  To improve our ability to 
predict human behavior, we must take account of the flexible 
nature of human belief and choice. 
 
 The Assumption that Actions Follow Beliefs   
Game theoretic models are utilized across a variety of 
domains to address important problems such as allocation 
of security forces (Pita et al. 2011), allocation of health 
care services (Roth 1990), and the design of institutions 
(Kagel and Roth 1997). Even a survey of surveys would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. (For a start, see Fudenberg 
and Tirole 1991, Ordeshook 1986, Nisan et. al. 2007, 
Tirole 1988.) Despite the prominent, and often quite 
successful, applications of game theory in these settings, 
we also observe many situations in which behavior does 
not accord with the predictions derived from game theory 
(for a survey see Camerer 2003).  
 To address the discrepancy between predicted and actual 
behavior, scholars have taken various approaches.  Three 
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of the most common approaches are to propose that 
discrepancies arise from (1) cognitive biases and 
dysfunctions in the decision-making of players (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979; Rabin and Thaler 2001; Ainslie 2001, 
Elster 1999); (2) mismatches between a game’s payoffs 
and an individual’s utility (Hoffman et. al. 1994, Rabin 
1993); and (3) the effects of uncertainty, bounded search 
ability, or limits in thinking about others’ likely behavior 
(Simon 1957, Gigerenzer and Selten 2002, Stahl and 
Wilson 1994; Crawford and Costa-Gomes 2006).  
 Although experimental subjects regularly make choices 
that do not comport with Nash equilibrium strategies (or 
even von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximization), 
this does not imply that human reasoning is flawed.    
Rather, human intelligence is flexible, creating enormous 
diversity of beliefs and choices, the challenge is that the 
models to which we put them to the test are not flexible.  
Humans are able to solve many tasks that are quite difficult 
(Gigerenzer 2000, 2008: Turner 2009). To build a better 
theory of human behavior, we must start with an 
appreciation for how we actually reason.  As cognitive 
science has shown, intuitive notions of how the mind 
works (vision, language, memory, etc.) may be very useful 
for the human being to hold as scaffolding for 
consciousness, but they are comprehensively wrong and 
simplistic. Intuitive notions of how we reason are not a 
basis for science.  How we reason must be discovered, not 
assumed, and certainly not borrowed from intuition 
 As is well known in game theory, Nash equilibrium 
requires players to have correct and consistent beliefs 
(Rasmusen 2006). To have “correct beliefs” is to regard 
other players as “Nash players” and to predict that they 
follow Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies. It is also required 
that players have “common knowledge” that they are all 
Nash players, that is, that they know that other players 
know that they themselves are following Nash equilibrium 
strategies, and so on, ad infinitum.  Lupia et. al. (2010) 
point out that “Common Nash refinements have similar 
attributes. Although these refinements differ in what they 
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allow players to know and believe, they continue to require 
that actors share identical conjectures of other players’ 
strategies” ( p. 106) 
 If players do not believe that other players will play 
consistent with Nash equilibria, then it is no longer true, 
relative to their beliefs, that their own best response is to 
follow a Nash equilibrium strategy. Recent experimental 
work has shown that subjects’ beliefs frequently do not 
match our theoretical assumptions and that their behavior 
can be reasonable, given their beliefs (McKenzie and 
Mikkelsen 2007). Some prior work on subjects’ beliefs in 
experimental games also suggests that subjects often have 
non-equilibrium beliefs (Kuhlman and Wimberely 1976; 
Croson 2007). In what follows, using a within-subjects 
design, we investigate choices in a large battery of games, 
and we elicit subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices 
and beliefs in these games, using an analog of prediction 
markets. 
Experimental Design 
We report on a portion of our battery of tasks here related 
to the well-known Trust game (as developed by Berg et al. 
1995). In our experiments, subjects know that their choices 
are always private and anonymous, even to the 
experimenters at the time of the experiment. Subjects 
receive no feedback, during the course of the experiment,  
about the consequences of their choices, except for quizzes 
related to our narratives/manipulations (subjects may, for 
some of our tasks, be able to infer the consequences of 
their choices).  For each task, subjects are randomly 
matched to another subject.  Thus, to the extent possible, 
given they were in narratives that describe games, every 
task is a single shot, separate from the prior and future 
choices.  We also ensure that no subject knows anyone else 
in either of the two rooms of the experiment. 
 The Trust game involves two players. Each player 
begins with a $5 endowment.  The first player chooses how 
many dollars, if any, to pass to an anonymous second 
player. In our experimental protocols, we use no labels 
other than “the other person(s).” To avoid suggesting an 
investment or reciprocity frame we label actions as 
“transfer.” The first player keeps any money he does not 
pass. The money that is passed is tripled in value and the 
second player receives the tripled amount. The second 
player at that point retains the original $5 plus three times 
the amount the first player passed, and decides how much, 
if any, of that total amount to return to the first player. The 
second player at the moment of choice in the Trust game is 
in a role that is equivalent to the role of Dictator in the 
Dictator game. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
(SPNE) is that Player 1 will send $0 and Player 2 will send 
$0. This is also a dominant strategy equilibrium. 
 These equilibrium strategies derive from assumed 
beliefs: the assumption is that all players maximize 
economic payoff and believe that all other players do the 
same.  In the Trust game, a Player 1 with these beliefs 
concludes that Player 2 will return nothing and so, as a 
maximizer, Player 1 sends nothing.   The beliefs that 
players hold about other players lead to the belief at every 
level of recursion that all players will send $0, will guess 
that others will send $0, will guess that others will predict 
that everyone will send $0, and so on ad infinitum.   
 But what happens if a subject with these Nash beliefs 
finds himself off the equilibrium path?  In the Trust game, 
only Player 2 could make a choice after finding himself or 
herself presented with an off-the-equilibrium-path choice.  
If Player 2 is gifted with anything more than his or her $5 
endowment, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
strategy is still to send $0 back.   
 We add elements to the basic Trust game to tap into 
subjects’ beliefs. Our belief elicitation mechanism borrows 
from the idea of a prediction market (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz 2004). For the Trust game, we ask Player 1 to 
make two additional decisions and Player 2 to make one 
additional decision. We do not ask subjects to report their 
expectations or beliefs, because asking for a report might 
have normative implications. Rather, we ask them to 
“guess” other subjects’ choices, or to guess other subjects’ 
“predictions.”  In general, we try to provide little or no 
framing of the experimental tasks offered to our subjects.  
After Player 1 makes his choice about how much to pass, 
we ask him to guess how much Player 2 will return.  
Before Player 2 learns Player 1’s choice, we ask Player 2 
to guess how much money Player 1 passed.  We also ask 
Player 2 to guess how much Player 1 predicted she would 
transfer.  After Player 2 learns Player 1’s choice, we ask 
Player 2 to guess how much Player 1 predicted she would 
return. All players know that all players earn $3 for each 
correct guess and earn nothing for a guess that is wrong.  
 The questions we ask vary slightly for each task, but as 
an example, here is the exact question we ask Player 2: 
“How much money do you guess the other person 
transferred to you? If you guess correctly, you will earn $3. 
If not, you will neither earn nor lose money.” We add 
similar incentivized prediction tasks to various 
experimental tasks. Players do not learn whether their 
predictions were right or wrong and subjects never have 
any information about other subjects’ guesses.   
 Players in the Trust game know that they are randomly 
paired with another subject in a different room. Later in the 
experiment, all subjects also make choices as Player 2, 
randomly assigned to the player in the other room who was 
Player 1.   Accordingly, all subjects first make choices as 
Player 1 and then, roughly 90 minutes later, make choices 
as Player 2 (randomly assigned to a different Player 1).  
They thus play Trust twice, but in different roles. Player 1 
never learns the consequences of any of his or her choices 
in the Trust game.  Player 2 can of course infer the 
consequences of his or her own choices. 
 Subjects also make decisions in a variety of other games, 
including a Dictator game and what we call the Donation 
game. In both these games, each subject is randomly paired 
with another subject in another room.  In the Dictator 
game, The Dictator (Player 1) and the Receiver (Player 2) 
have endowments identical to those the subject in the role 
of Dictator faced when he or she was in the role of Player 2 
faced in Trust.  Accordingly, the Dictator game was 
identical right down to the specific endowments to the 
second half of the Trust game. In effect, each subject 
replayed the second half of the Trust game, but now 
without the reciprocity frame. The SPNE is for the Dictator 
to send $0 to the Receiver.  The Donation game is 
identical, except that each player begins with a $5 
endowment and the amount Player 1 chooses to send is 
quadrupled before it is given to Player 2 (making it roughly 
similar to the choice faced by Player 1 in the Trust game).  
The SPNE is again for the Donor to send $0. 
 Our subjects also play, among other things, a unanimous 
Public Goods game with nine other players, randomly 
assigned. Each of the ten players in the group is endowed 
with $5. In these games, players must decide whether to 
keep their $5 or contribute all $5 to a “pot.”  In this task, if 
all players contribute their $5 endowment to the “pot,” then 
the money is tripled, and the money is distributed equally 
to all players, in which case each player gets $15.  There 
are two pure strategy Nash equilibria to this game.  In one, 
no one contributes, and each subject keeps the $5 
endowment.  In the second, everyone contributes, and 
everybody earns $15.  Subjects’ behavior in this step-level 
unanimity Public-goods game is conditioned on their 
beliefs about which equilibrium will arise.  If a player 
believes all other nine players are going to contribute, then 
he or she should contribute; if not, then not.     
   At the end of the experiment, we present the subjects 
with the few tasks that would allow them to learn 
something about the choices made by subjects in the other 
room.  So, for example, they are presented the tasks for 
Player 2’s choice in the Trust game as one of their final 
tasks.  In this last stage, we have no choice but to provide 
subjects with feedback in the form of information about 
what other subjects have done.  For example, Player 2 in 
Trust must know what Player 1 chose to send.  Only in this 
last stage, then, is there any chance for learning or 
development of individual or group reputations.   The order 
of experimental tasks is identical for all subjects in the 
experiment except during the public goods game, where by 
design we systematically manipulate the order of two 
tasks: (1) making choices and (2) guessing the choices 
made by others.   
 The subjects in our experiment completed the tasks 
using pen and paper in a controlled classroom 
environment. Subjects were recruited using flyers and 
email messages distributed across a large public California 
university and were not compelled to participate in the 
experiment, although they were given $5 in cash when they 
showed up. A total of 180 subjects participated in this 
experiment. The experiment lasted approximately two 
hours, and subjects received on average about $41 in cash.  
The experiment was followed sometime later with a post-
experiment questionnaire, for which subjects were also 
paid.   
Uncovering Subjects’ Beliefs 
 In many of our tasks, we ask subjects to make guesses 
about other players’ actions and predictions.  We pay the 
subjects $3 for correct guesses. All subjects in our 
experiments know this.  Do subjects believe what game 
theory assumes they believe?  The answer is, mostly, no. 
 The subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) in the 
Trust Game is that neither Player 1 nor Player 2 will send 
any money to the other.   All should believe that all others 
will predict that no one will send money, and all such 
beliefs should be recursive, so that Player A believes 
Player B believes Player A believes Player B will send no 
money, and so on for any number of steps and for any 
subject in any role.   
 But we see quite the contrary in our experiments: Figure 
1 shows that only 68 of 180 subjects as Player 2 believe 
that Player 1 will send nothing. In other words, 62% of 
subjects have “incorrect” beliefs, this is beliefs contrary to 
those that support SPNE strategies.     
 Figure 2 shows guesses made by Player 1 of the amount 
Player 2 will return.  We include even the Player 1s who 
sent nothing. (Since Player 2 begins with a $5 endowment, 
Player 2 can transfer money even if Player 1 sent nothing.)  
Ninety-two of the 180 subjects guess that Player 2 will 
return $0, but 88, or 49%, believe that Player 2 will return 
some money.  This means that 49% of these subjects have 
“incorrect” beliefs.  Their beliefs diverge broadly from 
SPNE, across a large span of possible returns.  
 We also investigate beliefs in other games. We have 160 
of our 180 subjects participate in a unanimous Public 
Goods game (in one session, one room received flawed 
instructions for this task and thus the behavior for all 20 
subjects is dropped from our analysis of this task). In this 
task, subjects have two choices: to contribute their $5 or 
not.  There are two pure strategy equilibria—one in which 
no one contributes and one in which all subjects contribute. 
Therefore, we are particularly interested in whether beliefs 
are consistent with one or the other of those equilibria. 
Subjects play the Public Goods game with nine other 
subjects, and we ask subjects to predict how many of the 
other nine subjects will contribute to the Public Good. We 
find that 47 of the 160 subjects (29.4%) guess that zero 
Figure 2: Many Player 1s expect money to be returned 
other subjects will contribute, and 42 subjects (26.2%) 
guess that all nine of the other subjects will contribute. The 
rest of the subjects, however, hold beliefs at variance to 
pure strategy NE: their guesses span the range of 
participation levels and are neither simple nor uniform. 
 One important telltale in this game comes when we 
balance the order of the tasks.  In some cases, we ask the 
subjects first to choose whether to contribute and second to 
guess the other subjects’ choices.  In other cases, we 
present the tasks in the reverse order. For the theory of 
games, the order of these two tasks cannot affect subjects’ 
strategies or choices. But our experiments show that 
subjects who choose first guess on average that  3.3 other 
players will contribute, while subjects who guess first 
guess on average that 4.6 other players will contribute 
(p=0.03 in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions 
test), with 80 subjects in each group. Further, in an equality 
of proportions tests 25% of subject choose to contribute 
when making their choice before their prediction, whereas 
43% choose to put their money in the pot when prompted 
about their beliefs before they made their choice (p<.03).  
This result suggests that changing the order of belief 
elicitation and choice significantly affects subjects’ beliefs. 
This simple change in task order does not accord with 
Nash equilibrium expectations. Are the subjects who guess 
after they choose simply winging it first and rationalizing 
later, or are the others simply winging their guesses first 
and then choosing according to something else later? 
 While we don’t know where beliefs come from, we can 
compare subjects’ beliefs about others in one part of the 
Trust game with their choices in that same part of the Trust 
game. For example, we can examine the difference 
between what a subject choose to do as Player 1 in the 
Trust game, and what they believe as Player 2 that Player 1 
will do.  The modal category is subjects believe that other 
subjects will play like them: 109 of the 180 subjects guess 
that the choice of the Player 1 with whom they are 
randomly matched will be the same as their own choice 
when they were Player 1. For these subjects, theory of 
mind might equal theory of self, or this may simply 
represent the “false consensus” effect in which people 
think others are more like them than they actually are 
(Ross et al. 1977), or it might be akin to the curse of 
knowledge, but we can’t really tell. Perhaps most 
surprising, there is a large variance, with 71 subjects (39%) 
making guesses that differ from their own choices.  
Consistently Inconsistent 
 The standard approaches to explaining departures from 
NE strategies (other-regarding preferences, cognitive 
constraints, or decision-making biases) implicitly assume 
that players deviate from game-theoretic expectations in 
consistent ways.  For example, if players prefer to reduce 
inequality, that preference should be stable across all 
manner of economic games. Or, if players cannot perform 
backward deletion of dominated sub-games, as game 
theory requires, then this handicap should operate in all 
game environments of equal difficulty. To date, there has 
been little focus on identifying the extent to which players 
have consistent beliefs or behavior across games.  
 Cognitive science gives us considerable reason to doubt 
that players will behave identically across different 
environments, because changes in environment lead to 
changes in mental activation, which affects beliefs and 
behavior.  As Sherrington famously wrote, the state of the 
brain is always shifting, “a dissolving pattern, always a 
meaningful pattern, though never an abiding one” 
(Sherrington [1941], 1964). If the particular tasks, and 
order of those tasks, induce different mental activations, 
then belief and behavior should vary accordingly.  Our 
experiment is designed to shed light on whether subjects 
have consistent beliefs and make consistent choices. 
Our first cut at this question is simply to examine the 
number of subjects who have beliefs consistent with NE 
Figure 1: Player 2 guesses of amount Player 1 sent 
across a variety of tasks. In the Trust game, subjects make 
predictions as Player 1 about the behavior of Player 2 and 
as Player 2 about the behavior of Player 1. We already 
demonstrated that in either single task, a great many 
subjects do not have SPNE beliefs. In Table 1, we show 
the number of subjects with Nash beliefs and non-Nash 
beliefs as both Player 1 and Player 2 in the Trust game. If 
Player 1 has Nash beliefs, it means that this subject 
guessed that Player 2 would return nothing. If Player 2 has 
Nash beliefs, it means that the subject guessed that Player 
1 would send nothing. Overall, out of 180 subjects in our 
analysis, only 63 subjects made guesses as both Player 1 
and 2 that were consistent with Nash beliefs. In other 
words, only 35% of our subjects have consistently “Nash 
beliefs” even inside this one game.   
There were 83 subjects who lacked Nash beliefs in both 
part of the Trust game, 29 subjects who possessed “Nash 
beliefs” as Player 1 but not as Player 2, and only 5 subjects 
who possessed “Nash beliefs” as Player 2 but not as Player 
1. Our experiment does not allow us to identify why 
players’ beliefs diverge from the NE beliefs, but it is clear 
that most subjects deviate from “Nash beliefs” during at 
least one of the experimental tasks.  
 We can also examine the actions/choices of individual 
subjects across a number of similar tasks to see if 
individual subjects behave consistently.  In particular, we 
look at subject behavior across a set of tasks, all of which 
involve choosing how much money to transfer to another 
person, and in which the outcome of that decision is not 
contingent on the other person. In the Trust game, subjects 
play the role of Player 1 and 2 during the course of the 
experiment.  There were 60 subjects who were “fully Nash 
actors” throughout the game; that is, they chose SPNE 
strategies (i.e., $0) as both Player 1 and Player 2.    
 Another way to investigate consistency of behavior is to 
examine the choices of subjects who as Player 2 in Trust 
received money from Player 1.  Of the 100 subjects who 
received money as Player 2 in Trust, only 62 returned any 
of the money to Player 1. Additionally, of those 62, only 
40 sent money in the Dictator game. This shows that many 
subjects do not behave consistently in these two tasks, in 
which their actions could reduce inequality. Further, of the 
40 who sent money in Dictator, only 29 also send money in 
the Donation game. This means that of the 100 subjects 
who received money as Player 2 in Trust, only 29 sent 
money to the other player in all three related tasks. This 
shows that subjects do not behave consistently even in 
their violations of SPNE.  
 We have seen, and the literature broadly documents, that 
subjects deviate remarkably from Nash equilibrium 
strategies.  We have reported how subjects’ beliefs deviate 
from those necessary to support equilibrium strategies.   
We have also shown that these deviations are not 
consistent.  Accordingly, it is doubtful that proposals to 
explain deviation from Nash strategies and beliefs by 
attributing to subjects a particular consistent mental or 
behavioral signature will succeed.    
Does behavior accord with beliefs? 
 Now, we ask whether actions are minimally rational, 
that is, do subjects’ actions accord with their beliefs?  To 
begin, we investigate whether action and belief accord in 
the Trust game.  Figure 3 shows the decisions of subjects 
as Player 1 about the amount of money to send to Player 2 
in the Trust game. Over one-half of subjects (100 out of 
180) pass money, which is inconsistent with a SPNE 
strategy, and on average subjects pass $1.43. Of the 100 
subjects who receive money as Player 2, 62 of them return 
some money to Player 1.  On net, Player 1 loses money. 
This result—that players choose to pass some money in the 
Trust game—has been well-documented (Berg et al. 1995). 
 Figure 4 displays the difference between the amount 
Player 1 sends to Player 2 and the amount Player 1 guesses 
Player 2 will return.  Recall that any money sent by Player 
1 is tripled before it is sent to Player 2, (e.g., if Player 1 
sends all $5, then Player 2 has $20, and if Player 2 splits 
that money, then Player 1 and Player 2 end with $10 each, 
and we would say that each has “earned” $5 through their 
actions).  Figure 4 shows that there are only a few players 
 Player 2 Player 2 
 Nash beliefs Non-Nash 
beliefs 
P
la
y
er
 1
 Nash beliefs 63 29 
Non-Nash 
beliefs 
5 83 
Table 1: Subjects’ beliefs in Trust game (N=180) 
Figure 3: Distribution of amount Player1s pass in Trust game 
who guess that they will lose money by sending money to 
the other player. Mostly, players expect to benefit from 
their decision. The beliefs held by these players imply not 
only that they do not expect others to play consistently 
with SPNE strategies, but also that they expect, on average, 
to profit from their non-SPNE strategy to send money. 
 There are 100 subjects who as Player 1 in Trust chose to 
send a positive amount to Player 2, and 20 of those players 
guess they will not receive anything in return. These 20 
players guess that Player 2 will follow a SPNE strategy.  
These 20 subjects cannot simultaneously be maximizing 
their payoffs and hold the belief that Player 2 will follow a 
SPNE strategy of returning $0 so it is hard to see how their 
choices accord with their own beliefs. We must either 
conclude that they are not payoff maximizers or relax the 
assumption that subjects act according to beliefs.  One way 
to relax that assumption is to give up the assumption that 
believing, preferring, deciding, and acting are simultaneous 
and coordinated mental events.  Perhaps subjects act 
without fully activating their decisions, or believe without 
activating the consequences of those beliefs for action, or 
act without activating beliefs, and so on.     
  Recall that earlier we identified 60 subjects who were 
“fully Nash actors” in the Trust game, that is, the subjects 
whose actions as both Player 1 and 2 were consistent with 
SPNE strategy. We turn now to these 60 subjects and 
examine whether their beliefs are “fully Nash” in the Trust 
game. The answer is no. First, let us consider these 60 
subjects in the role of Player 1 in Trust.  Of these 60 
subjects, 56 guessed as Player 1 that Player 2 would return 
nothing, which is consistent with SPNE.  They also 
guessed Player 2’s prediction of the amount they will pass. 
Only 40 of the 60 “fully Nash” Trust players (66%) 
guessed that Player 2 predicted that they would transfer $0.  
The other 20 of the 60 “fully Nash” Trust players (1/3rd) 
lacked that SPNE belief. They also guessed Player 2’s 
prediction of Player 1’s guess of what Player 2 will return.   
Of the 60 subjects, 49 (81%) had beliefs consistent with 
SPNE. These results show that even the 60 “fully Nash” 
Trust subjects hold beliefs whose degree of consistency 
with SPNE principles varies question by question even 
when we look at only those questions asked of them when 
they are in the role of Player 1.  Beliefs show flexibility.  
 We next turn to the beliefs of those 60 “fully Nash” 
Trust subjects when they are in the role of Player 2 in 
Trust.  Of the 60, 44 guess that Player 1 will transfer 
nothing; that is, 16 of 60 (27%) lack SPNE beliefs.  Of the 
60, 35 guess that Player 1 predicts that they will return 
nothing; that is, for this question, 42% of these 60 “fully 
Nash” Trust subjects have beliefs that are inconsistent with 
SPNE. Overall, non-SPNE beliefs are quite common even 
among the 60 “fully Nash” actors in the Trust Game.  
Beliefs show flexibility  
 Next, we ask whether the 60 “fully-Nash” actors in Trust 
are “fully Nash” in the related Donation and Dictator 
games.  Here we find that 57 of the 60 subjects pass $0 in 
the Dictator game and 50 of the 60 pass $0 in the Donation 
game. If we focus on those 57 subjects who are “fully Nash 
actors” as both Player 1 and Player 2 in Trust and also as 
Dictator in the Dictator game, we find that 48 of the 57 
(84%) pass nothing in the Donation game. Therefore, 
across our entire 180 subjects, only 48 (27%) have 
consistent Nash behavior in Trust, Donation, and Dictator. 
The results from our battery of experimental tasks 
demonstrate that subjects regularly deviate from SPNE in 
both their beliefs and behavior, that the deviations are 
themselves inconsistent, and that there is variation in the 
degree to which behavior accords with belief.    
Discussion 
Our results show, as is usually shown, that subjects deviate 
from game-theoretic predictions.  Our findings also show 
that these deviations are not consistent; they depend on the 
specific setting and task.  Our results demonstrate that 
beliefs are also inconsistent. These deviations are so 
pervasive and so various even within subject that is seems 
unwarranted to refer to them as “deviations.” On the 
contrary, consistent “Nash behavior and beliefs” appear to 
be remarkable deviations from human cognitive patterns 
and human behavioral norms.  It may be that people can be 
trained to comply with these deviations, at least to some 
extent, for rare and specially-designed cultural conditions, 
such as strategic board games, under the additional 
stipulations that the other human beings in the story are 
somehow constrained and also trained to be deviant in the 
same ways.  
 Our results are not consistent with a view that decision 
and action are coordinated around inflexible beliefs and 
preferences.  Rather, different tasks and settings appear to 
Figure 4: Guesses by Player 1 of profit from choice 
lead to different mental activations in subjects, and 
subjects respond flexibly.  This flexibility has not been 
well-appreciated by existing approaches to modeling 
human action in economic settings. Research into decision-
making should turn now to the goal of discovering what 
those cognitive patterns of decision-making actually are. 
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